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FERC RULING UNDERMINES ENERGY FEDERALISM 




art II of the Federa l Power Act (FPA) requires that 
all prices set for the sa le of electricity affecting inter-
state commerce between electrical utilities be "just and 
reasonable."1 Pursuant to thi s requirement, the FPA authori zes 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commiss ion (FERC) to suspend 
such electricity sa les prices upon findin g that they unduly di s-
advantage or di scriminate between locations or types of power 
plants.2 In ass igning thi s limited jurisdiction to the federal gov-
ernment, and by expli citly reserving to the states the exclusive 
juri sdiction over the mix of power plants suppl ying electricity 
demand, the FPA mandates a cooperative federali sm model of 
electricity sector regulation .3 
A recent FERC rulin g in Calpine Corp. v. PJM 
Interconnection, LLC4 expansive ly interprets federal regula-
tory authori ty under the FPA, asserting that state subsidies fo r 
c lean energy provide grounds for FERC to suspend electri city 
price-setting acti vity.5 This Arti cle argues that FERC's ruling 
in Calpine not onl y undermines the FPA's federa li st structure, 
but also arbitrarily and capriciously pena li zes state support fo r 
renewable and nuclear energy while permitt ing hi stori c and 
ongoing state support for foss il -fuel based electricity. By reject-
ing states' legitimate preferences for low emiss ions electricity, 
FERC 's Calpine ruling limits states' ability to mitigate climate 
change by reducing greenhouse gas emiss ions fro m the electri c-
ity sector. These efforts are parti cularly important at a time when 
federal leadership on climate change is conspicuously absent.6 
I. THE FEDERALIST BALA'iCE IN 
ELECTRICIT\ SECTOR REGULATIO'\' 
While fo unded as vertica l monopolies , e lectri c utiliti es 
today exist in a nationa lly interconnected market.7 Utiliti es have 
dramati cally improved service re liabil ity and reduced operating 
costs by sharing power generation, transmi ss ion, and di stribu-
tion infras tructure in regional electrical grids.8 FERC has exer-
cised its juri sdiction over the resulting interstate commerce by 
mandating the fo rmation of reg ional transmiss ion organizati ons 
(RTOs) to coord inate, contro l, and monitor regional electri ca l 
grids.9 Among other ro les , RTOs sati sfy electri c ity demand 
across the ir g rid by operating auctions in whi ch electri c ity 
generation companies (GENCOs) compete to se ll e lectri city to 
utilities at the lowest price.10 RTOs set a fl at "clea ring" pri ce 
received by all GENCOs at the lowest bidding price that sati sfies 
the demand for the entire network.11 
Exerci sing their concurrent jurisdiction over in-state power 
plants, the Di stri ct of Columbia and ten of the thirteen states in 
Spring 2019 
the M id-At lanti c reg ion RTO, PJM, implemented Renewabl e 
Portfo lio Standards (RPS).12 RPS programs require that utilities 
serving the state source a spec ified percentage of the ir electricity 
suppl y from spec ifi ed renewable and nuclear ene rgy resourc-
es.1 3 To meet RPS targets, state governments and utiliti es offer 
a combin ation of subsidies to renewable and nuc lear energy 
GENCOs, including rebates, tax incentives, and credits. 14 In 
Calp ine, a natu ral gas GENCO fil ed a comp la int with FERC 
claiming PJM states ' RPS subsidies "artifi cially suppress" PJM 
electri c ity prices by a llowing " uncompetiti ve" renewable and 
nuclear energy GENCOs to submit bids that do not reflect their 
actual costs. 15 FERC commiss ioners subsequently ordered PJM 
to " mitigate" the effect of state renewa bl e energy subsidies in 
the interstate electri city market. 16 
II. FERC's CALPJ.VE RLu c U DER:\11'.'IES 
STATE JLRJSDICTIO"li OVER l'\TRASTATE 
ELECTRICITY GE ERATIO ' 
In Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, 17 the Supreme 
Court emphas ized that, given the interconnected nature of the 
modern electric g rid, FERC's interstate regulations and states' 
intrastate regulations will inevitably affect each other. 18 These 
crossover impacts are not only permiss ible but intended under 
the FPA's federa li st structure; the only limitation is that neither 
sovereign may intenti onally target the other 's jurisdiction.19 The 
mere ex istence of crossover impacts is not suffi c ient to show 
intentional targeting; instead, to show that a state overreached its 
j uri sdiction, a pla inti ff GENCO must prove that the state directly 
conditi oned or " tethered" the GENCO 's subsidy e lig ibili ty on 
suppl ying electr icity through an RT0.20 
The RPS subsidies at issue in Calpine do no t satisfy the 
Hughes intentional targeting test. The RPS subs idi es are di s-
tinguished fro m other state energy po li c ies rejected by FERC 
and courts because they neither required subsid ized GENCOs 
to submit bids that c lear PJM 's capac ity market a uction nor 
guaranteed those GENCOs an e lectri c ity p ri ce di stinct from 
the interstate wholesa le clearing price set by the RT0.21 In thi s 
regard, the RPS subsidies are ne ither intentiona lly targeted at 
RTO electri city markets under federa l juri sdicti on no r "tethered" 
to GEN CO partic ipati on in PJM 's capac ity ma rket, and thus 
fa ll squarely within state jurisdiction. In rnling that RTOs may 
frustrate state subsidies for in-state power pl ants not directl y ti ed 
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to RTO market participation , FERC's Calpine ruling implies 
an unlimited federal juri sd iction over GE COs, which was not 
contemplated by FPA's statutory structure. 
III. FERC's C 1LPJiVE Rt.,u G ARBITRARILY 
T \RGETS RE E\\ \BLEA D NLCLE\R E ERG\'. 
Regardl ess of its exerci se of jurisdiction, FERC's applica-
tion of the FPA's "j ust and reasonable" provision in Calpine to 
overturn PJM states' RPS subsidies for renewable and nuclear 
energy is arbitrary and capricious.22 FERC's mandate to ensure 
RTO electricity wholesale rates are "just and reasonable" is, in 
essence, an obligation to reflect the price that an efficient market 
would produce.23 FERC's Calpine ruling emphasized that state 
RPS subsidies threaten the integrity of PJM 's capacity market 
because they a llow certain GE COs to submit suppressed 
bids in PJM capacity market without competing on a compa-
rable basis with "competitive" resources .24 However, FERC's 
Calpine ruling arbitraril y ignores the market distorting effects 
of longstanding state and federal subsidies for fossil fuel-based 
electricity generation. 25 These subsidies have propped up uneco-
nomical and aging fossil fuel power plants by allowing fossil 
fuel GE COs to submit suppressed bids into RTO capacity mar-
kets .26 A reasonable and hi storically consistent application of 
FERC's Calpine standard, therefore, would require P JM to miti-
gate states ' longstanding subsidy support for fossil fuel-based 
electricity, not just its newer subsidy support for renewable and 
nuclear energy. 
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